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Abstract—With the continuous advances in mobile wireless 
sensor networks (MWSNs), the research community has 
responded to the challenges and constraints in the design of these 
networks by proposing efficient routing protocols that focus on 
particular performance metrics such as residual energy utilization, 
mobility, topology, scalability, localization, data collection routing, 
Quality of Service (QoS), etc. In addition, the introduction of 
mobility in WSN has brought new challenges for the routing, 
stability, security, and reliability of WSNs. Therefore, in this 
article, we present a comprehensive and meticulous investigation 
in the routing protocols and security challenges in the theory of 
MWSNs which was developed in recent years. 
 
Keywords—WSN, routing, security 
I. INTRODUCTION 
IRELESS Sensor Network (WSN) refers to the network 
consisting of multiple computational units with the 
ability to sense specific physical properties of the environment. 
The computational units which are called sensor nodes are 
connected together through wireless links to each other and a 
special node called base station or sink [1]. The sensor node is 
a small device with tiny sensors that can be deployed either 
inside the parameter of the phenomenon which is required to be 
monitored or deployed close to it. Sensor nodes can be equipped 
with different types of sensors and can monitor various 
properties and phenomena. The types of sensors include 
vibration sensors which monitor earthquakes, thermal sensors 
for monitoring temperatures and climate changes, acoustic 
sensors for sensing sound waves and noise levels, visual sensors 
to measure lightening condition, infrared and radar sensors to 
sense the presence or absence of objects, and vehicular 
movement, speed, and directions sensor to measure mobility. 
Sensor nodes contain sensing components and a transceiver unit 
to send and receive data from a central processing station. Many 
applications of WSN require the sensor node to conduct data 
collection, data analysis, and correlation of the data collected by 
the node sensors. To achieve the required tasks, sensor nodes 
are equipped with sensors, processing capabilities, 
communication units, and onboard storage [2].  
While the interest in the WSN applications is rapidly 
emerging nowadays, the technology of using sensors for special 
proposes can be traced back to older times. In the mid-1950s 
and during the Cold War, The United States Navy installed a big 
network of underwater sensors that can detect Soviet 
submarines that are using quiet technologies. The project was 
called the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), which is used 
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today for scientific purposes such as monitoring whales and 
oceans temperature. Similar to the underwater monitoring 
system, Air Defense deployed monitoring systems by using 
sensors installed on aerostatic balloons. In 1980, the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency started the Distributed 
Sensor Networks (DSN) project, which is considered the actual 
beginning of the WSNs [3] [4]. One of the major advancements 
in the WSN field is the introduction of the Mobile Wireless 
Sensor Network (MWSN). In the MWSN, the sensor nodes are 
mobile which makes the sensor network applications more 
versatile compared to the static nodes. The mobile nodes' 
movement can be either dependent or independent of each other. 
Some applications in the fields of healthcare, military, 
transportation, and industry require the mobility of sensor nodes 
to support the mobility of the sensed objects [5][6]. The mobility 
introduces new challenges to the sensors network such as the 
network coverage and reliability of communication as well as 
introducing new security challenges. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: In 
Section 2, we present an overview of wireless sensor networks 
structure, topologies and applications. In section 3 we discuss 
routing in WSN, in particular, we present the routing challenges 
and intensive discussion of the routing protocols classifications 
which proposed in the literature. Section 4 provides detail 
investigation in the security aspects of WSN, and the proposed 
state-of-art routing mechanisms in the literature. Finally, section 
5 concludes the article. 
II. OVERVIEW OF WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
MWSNs are an advanced type of Wireless Sensor Networks 
(WSN), which present mobility as a new factor for both sensor 
nodes and the base station. Because the mobility introduces new 
challenges to the network such as reliability and security 
challenges, MWSNs require considerations in regard to the 
network topology, routing protocols, physical security, and 
information security.    
A. MWSN Network Topology 
In MWSN, a network is considered effective if both data 
collection and topology management are reliable. The network 
topology should provide guaranteed quality of the service 
regarding the mobility, traffic, and network connection stability 
Network topology management is the task responsible for 
managing the membership of sensor nodes group by managing 
the new and withdrawn members. Depending on the nature of 
the MWSN, in order to achieve the best performance and to 
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ensure reliable data gathering. different types of network 
topologies are deployed. Such as: flat or unstructured, chain, 
mesh, tree, clustered, and hybrid [7]. 
B. Routing in MWSN 
Routing protocols for MWSN require consideration of the 
mobility nature of the nodes as well as the changes in the 
network topology. In static approaches of WSNs, the nodes and 
the base stations are stationary and the distances, signal ranges, 
and neighbour nodes are known to each member of the network. 
Unlike stationary approaches, mobility approaches should 
consider all types of applications of MWSNs. There are three 
mobility approaches: (a) Static base station and moving nodes, 
(b) Moving base station and static nodes, and (c) moving base 
station and moving sensor nodes. Routing protocols in MWSN 
are inspired by both its predecessor the Wireless Sensor 
Network and the Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET). While 
MANET protocols are designed to support mobility, there are 
several considerations to be made regarding the variations 
between MANET and MWSN. While the main objective of the 
MWSN is to collect information from sensor nodes, MANET is 
designed to manage distributed computing units. MWSN 
networks can be much bigger in coverage and in the number of 
sensing nodes that are needed to study a phenomenon. MWSN 
nodes mainly communicate by broadcast data and mainly 
toward the sink node while MANET nodes use point to point 
two-way irregular communications. Because of their unattended 
operations, cost, and size, sensor nodes in MWSN have limited 
resources and computational power comparing to the 
counterparts in MANET [8] [9] [10]. Routing protocols in WSN 
are categorized based on several properties. Depending on the 
network structure, routing protocols are classified as (a) Flat 
based routing protocols where all nodes are assigned similar 
roles, (b) hierarchical based routing where nodes have different 
roles, and (c) location-based routing where the location of the 
nodes is used for routing. Furthermore, routing protocols are 
classified based on the process performed to find the route to the 
destination. In this classification, there are three categories 
which are (a) Proactive routing where the routes are pre-
calculated and pre-determined, (b) Reactive routing where the 
routing paths are determined on request, and (c) Hybrid routing 
where both proactive and reactive routing is used. When the 
nodes are stationary, the preferred approach is to precompute 
the routing paths rather than calculating the routing paths on 
demand. Energy and computational limitations add more 
resource challenges as a significant amount of energy are 
consumed during proactive computations of routing paths. From 
an operation perspective, the routing protocols can be classified 
into (a) negotiation-based routing protocols, where the routing 
protocol preserve the energy by reducing the data redundancy 
during communication, (b) query-based routing protocols where 
the sink node broadcasts queries regarding the nodes sensing 
task and the associated sensing node uses the reverse routing 
path to send the collected data back, (c) multipath-based routing 
protocols which uses deferent alternative paths to enhance the 
availability and security, (d) QoS-based routing protocols which 
benefits from controlling the congestion and satisfying the 
quality of service requirements such as bandwidth and delay 
[11], and (e) coherent-based routing protocols where the nodes 
perform minimum data processing and the data is sent to the 
upper levels for more processing  [12] [13] [14] [7]. Figure 1 
shows the routing protocols classifications in MWSNs. 
III. STATE-OF-THE-ART MWSN ROUTING PROTOCOLS 
In this section, well known state-of-the-art MWSN routing 
protocols and their enhanced variants are discussed. The section 
focuses on the functionality and the security mechanism of the 
routing protocols that are suitable for MWSN. 
A. LEACH Family 
Low-energy adaptive clustering hierarchy (LEACH) routing 
protocol is one of the most popular hierarchically clustered 
routing protocols for WSNs [7]. The protocol is designed for 
distributed networks and does not require global network 
knowledge. LEACH is considered Time-division multiple 
access (TDMA) which allows transmission over the same 
channel with different time slot per transmitter. LEACH offers 
low energy consumption by allowing nodes to use minimal 
transmission power to reach cluster heads by activating their 
transceivers during scheduled time slots only. In LEACH, data 
transmission is divided into fixed time intervals or rounds. 
There are two phases in each round, which are the setup phase 
and the steady-state phase. During the setup phase, cluster heads 
will be chosen with an equal probability based on the nodes' 
signal strength and residual energy. If the node became a cluster 
head, it cannot become a cluster head again until all nodes have 
been chosen. Also, multi-hop communications are established 
between the cluster heads and the base station during the setup 
phase. During the steady-state phase, data is collected from 
cluster members by the cluster heads in communication called 
intra-cluster transmission. After that, the aggregated data will be 
comprised and forwarded to the base station in communication 
called the inter-cluster transmission. LEACH protocol is very 
efficient in extending the lifetime of the static nodes in WSN 
however, its efficiency degrades for large mobile networks 
which triggered the design of LEACH variants such as 
TLEACH, LEACH-mobile, and LEACH-mobile-enhanced [7]. 
LEACH has some limitations such as random and uneven 
cluster heads distribution all over the network and the selection 
process considers only remaining energy for selecting cluster 
heads. There are situations when one-hop communication 
between cluster heads and the base station is not energy 
efficient. The inefficient randomization process of the cluster 
head formations is another limitation of LEACH [15].     
Because LEACH protocol does not account for the movement 
of the nodes after each round, there will be serious data loss in 
MWSN where nodes are frequently moving. LEACH-mobile 
was proposed by Kim and Chung to solve the nodes' mobility 
issues [16]. Unlike in the LEACH protocol where nodes will be 
communicating with their cluster heads, LEACH–mobile solve 
the communication by allowing the nodes that cannot connect 
to their cluster heads during two consecutive TDMA schedules 
to request joint another cluster head by broadcasting cluster 
head joint request. The approach enhances the connectivity of 
mobile nodes moving outside the radio range of their cluster 
heads [17] [7] [18].  LEACH-mobile assumes that cluster heads 
are stationary and therefore mobile cluster heads may cause 
some data loss. To overcome this issue, Kumar et al. proposed 
an enhancement to the LEACH-mobile protocol [19] called 
LEACH-mobile-enhanced (LEACH-ME). LEACH-ME 
considers the mobility factor in the cluster heads’ selection 
process.  
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Fig. 1. Classification of routing protocols. 
 
The mobility factor is calculated in each time frame, based on 
the velocity of the node and the amount of time the node takes 
to move between two locations. Although LEACH-ME is more 
reliable for MWSNs, the calculation of the mobility factor for 
each node in each frame consumes a significant amount of 
energy [18].  
TLEACH was proposed by Qi and Min to address the mobility 
of all nodes in MWSNs. The protocol enhances the power 
consumption and packets delivery rate by using tree-based 
routing, power control, and multi-hop transmission. Due to the 
enhancements the protocol provides, it can handle large 
MWSNs and uneven distributed mobile nodes [20].  
TLEACH consists of two phases, which are the topology 
construction and the topology maintenance stages. In the 
topology construction phase, a data aggregation tree is 
constructed as well as the cluster structure and multi-hop 
mechanism. In the topology maintenance phase, the network is 
maintained based on multi-hop transmission, mobility reactions 
of the nodes, and mobile cluster reactions. In comparison with 
LEACH and LEACH-mobile [20], TLEACH was observed to 
provide more effectively established and maintenance of the 
topological structure of large and uneven mobile network in 
terms of energy consumption and delivery rate [7]. 
“Optimizing LEACH protocol” was introduced by Mottaghi 
and Zahabi Based on LEACH and influenced by the mobile sink 
and rendezvous points. The protocol follows the same LEACH 
structure with modification to include a rendezvous node 
schedule for collecting data [21]. 
B. Mobile Sink-Based Routing Protocol (MSRP) 
In MWSN, nodes near the base station are required to forward 
significantly more traffic than the rest of the nodes and therefore 
consume more energy and die sooner. This creates hotspots in 
the network. Several protocols have addressed this issue such as 
MSRP. MSRP is a hierarchically clustered protocol that was 
designed to address the problem of hotspot or energy holes that 
form near the base station and therefore prolong the lifetime of 
the network. MSRP is based on a moving sink approach that 
collects the data from the cluster heads. The movement of the 
sink is related to the residual energy of the cluster head where  
the sink will move toward the cluster head with the higher 
energy to keep the nodes near sink connected as long as 
possible. The protocol has two phases which are the setup phase 
and steady-state phase. In the setup phase, the cluster heads are 
selected and the sink advertised its location. The sink then 
broadcast Time-division multiple access (TDMA) schedule to 
the cluster heads during the steady-state phase. Once the sink 
collects the information from a cluster head, it moves to the next 
cluster head with the highest remaining energy [22] [18].  
C. Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) 
MWSN inherits routing protocols from MANETs and WSN. 
In most cases, MANET protocols are much efficient than WSN 
for mobility. AODV is one of the MANET routing protocols, 
which are design for both wireless and mobile communication 
scenarios. AODV is an on-demand protocol that builds routing 
paths only if demanded by the communication parties in the 
network. Because AODV creates routes on demand and these 
routes will be kept as long as needed, the need for RREQ and 
RREP communications are reduced to the minimum, which 
helps in reducing the consumption of energy, and allowing 
nodes to enter power-saving modes. To ensure route 
information freshness, AODV utilizes sequence numbers. When 
a node requests a routing to a destination, the node will 
broadcast the request to its neighbours. Neighbour nodes will 
forward the message and will create temporary routes to the 
requester node. The requester node will receive back the route 
to the destination and will keep the route with the least number 
of hops. All routing entries produced from the route request will 
be purged when not required. Multicast in AODV will benefit 
from the same routes caches processes, QoS, address 
aggregation, and auto-configuration. AODV is shaped from the 
Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector (DSDV) routing 
protocol with on-demand consideration. Although DSDV is 
considered an effective protocol given that all the nodes in the 
network involved in all changes, DSDV requires massive 
numbers of broadcast updates and therefor will consume more 
traffic and more energy resources. Unlike DSDV, AODV 
broadcasts are minimal. When a link between nodes breaks, 
only involved nodes will communicate where in DSDV, this 
event requires routing broadcast to all nodes [23] [24].     
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D. Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 
DSR is one of the purest on-demand routing protocol where 
any communication is only triggered by node request. DSR uses 
source routing where the routed packets will contain the address 
of all nodes in the path for the destination. For mobile nodes, the 
packet routing information will be updated at each node. For 
long paths or large sets of addresses, there will be high overhead 
since the packets have to carry the information related to the full 
path. 
DSR contains two main mechanisms which are route 
discovery and route maintenance. During the route discovery, 
multiple paths will be generated toward the same destination. 
During the route maintenance phase, the protocol is unable to 
locally repair broken paths. While DSR is a simple and efficient 
protocol, it is designed originally for MANETs and has a limited 
efficiency when it is used for a large number of nodes in MWSN 
[23] [25]. 
E. Artificial Bee Colony (ABC) Based Routing Protocol 
ABC algorithm was proposed by Karaboga and Basturk [26] 
for the optimization of the numerical functions. The algorithm 
is based on swarm intelligence and benefits from the bee 
colonies' studies. ABC divide the bees into three groups, which 
are employed bees, onlookers, and scouts. The onlooker bees 
are the bees waiting to make a decision regarding the food 
source. The employed bee is the bee that is going to the food 
source, which has been visited by the same bee before. A scout 
bee is a bee carrying random searches. The ABC algorithm 
colony consists of two halves. The first half contains the 
employed bees and the second half contains the onlooker bees. 
There is only one food source per bee. When the bee’s food 
source is exhausted, the bee becomes a scout [26] [7] [18]. 
The ABC algorithm was used to enhance routing in WSNs and 
MWSNs by researchers. Yue et al. proposed an optimized-
ABC-based algorithm for data collection in large-scale 
MWSNs. They based the optimization on choosing the optimal 
path for the sink node movement, the cluster heads, and the 
routing shortest paths in order to collect information from nodes 
[27].  
F. Mobility adaptive cross-layer routing (MACRO) 
Cakici et al. proposed a routing protocol to overcome the 
existing packet delay, energy consumption, and end-to-end 
reliability issues in mobile sensor networks. The protocol is 
based on the interaction of the five reference layers, which are 
physical, media access, network, transport, and application 
layers. The proposed protocol accounts for the available routing 
path as well as the routing reliability, which is affected by 
topology changes. Channel conditions such as congestions and 
failures of the nodes are adapted to preserve the reliability while 
adapting to the possible topologies’ changes. MACRO protocol 
consists of route discovery, route management, and data 
forwarding algorithms. In large MWSNs with frequent topology 
changes, the route discovery process may cause large packet 
delay [28].  MACRO is proven to provide better packet delivery 
ratio and lower end-to-end delay when benchmarked against 
LEACH-mobile and the cluster-based cross-layer routing 
protocol (CBR-mobile) [29] [7]. 
G. Energy Management with Multiple Sinks (EMMS) 
In many WSN routing protocols, the routing protocol is based 
on single sink deployment. EMMS proposed by Shi et al. to 
benefits from multiple mobile sink nodes to prolong the network 
lifetime by reducing the energy consumption [30]. The proposed 
protocol addresses the challenge of managing the movement of 
the mobile sink nodes to balance the sensors' data collection 
workload among the different sinks. The movement of the sink 
is a closed tour of trajectory roads in the network area. The 
proposed algorithm consists of two stages, which are finding a 
close tour as the first stage and determining the sojourn locations 
of the mobile sink in the second stage. In the first stage, the 
algorithm will find a close tour with almost equal length for each 
sink. In the second stage, the algorithm will determine sojourn 
locations and build the routing tree for each location and for 
each sink considering the sink stopover time in each location for 
collecting the data from nodes. EMMS improves the residual 
energy utilization as well as the transmission quality for 
MWSNs [30] [7] [18].   
H. Mobility-Based Clustering (MBC) Protocol 
MBC protocol was proposed by Deng et al. to address the 
mobility and other performance issues in MWSN [31]. Similar 
to LEACH, MBC is a hierarchal-based cluster protocol. The 
nodes will be elected as cluster heads based on the residual 
energy and the mobility with equal probability for each node to 
be a cluster head. The operation of the protocol is divided into 
two stages, which are the setup stage and the steady-state stage 
in each round. In the setup stage, cluster heads will be selected 
with consideration to the connection time between the nodes in 
a cluster and their cluster head for more reliable and stable 
routing paths. In the steady-state stage, the data transfer to the 
cluster head in intra-cluster communication and from the cluster 
head to the sink in inter-cluster communication in each round. 
While the operations of MBC and LEACH are similar, MBC 
provides more stability and better performance in mobile-based 
applications because LEACH is not effective in large mobile 
networks. However, MBC may face some issues related to 
packet dropping, link breakage, and reduced network utilization 
due to its failure to address the problem of critical node 
occurrence [7] [18]. 
I. Cluster-Based Routing Protocol for MWSN (CBR–
MWSN) 
CBR-MWSN is a cluster-based routing protocol that was 
proposed by Awwad et al. to address the mobility of nodes and 
energy consumption [29]. CBR-MWSN is round free and uses 
the adaptive Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) approach. 
In CBR-MWSN the cluster head will collect the data from its 
member nodes as well as other nodes that lost their connection 
to their allocated cluster heads and just entered its radio range, 
subject to the availability of free time slot in its schedule. Cluster 
heads take a turn to be free and they adaptively change their 
TDMA schedule according to the mobility and traffic. The 
simulation result of CBR-MWSN showed a reduction in the data 
packet loss by 25% comparing to LEACH-mobile. However, 
CBR-MWSN will consume more energy due to the operational 
overhead compared to LEACH-mobile [29] [18].  
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J. Power-Efficient Gathering in Sensor Information Systems 
(PEGASIS) & Mobile Sink Improved Energy-Efficient 
PEGASIS-Based Routing Protocol (MIEEPB) 
PEGASIS was proposed by Lindsey and Raghavendra to 
prolong the lifetime of the network [32]. PEGASIS developers 
were influenced by the LEACH protocol. PEGASIS use chain-
based communication to distribute the workload of transmitting 
to the base station among the sensor nodes. Similar to the idea 
of cluster heads in LEACH, neighbor nodes in PEGASIS will 
form groups between them and will take a turn to send the 
collected data from the group. Only one node from the group 
will communicate with the base station at each round. The 
assumption given in the PEGASIS proposal is that the base 
station is located far away from all nodes and it has a fixed 
location. During the simulation, PEGASIS showed 
improvement from 100% to 300% in prolonging the lifetime of 
the network over LEACH [32] [33]. Although PEGASIS 
enhances the power consumption, the protocol does not account 
for the mobility of nodes and the mobility of the base station, 
with the performance improvement is limited to the assumption 
of the base station being located far away from nodes.  
An enhancement to the PEGASIS was proposed by Jafri et al. 
to account for the mobility and to provide efficiency of power 
consumption in MWSNs. The proposed protocol called Mobile 
Sink Improved Energy-Efficient PEGASIS-Based Routing 
Protocol (MIEEPB). In MIEEPB, the field will be divided into 
four zones and smaller chains will be formed at each zone. The 
leader node of each chain will be selected by accounting for the 
distance from the sink and the residual energy. The mobile sink 
will make scheduled stopovers to each zone to ensure data 
collection and reduce power consumption needed to transmit the 
data [33] [18].   
K. Other State-of-the-Art Routing Protocols 
In the previous list of routing protocols, the discussion focused 
on well-known and most researched protocols with different 
approaches. In addition, there are many other protocols that are 
influenced by these well-known state-of-the-art protocols and 
some of them will be briefly discussed below.  
Velmani and Kaarthick proposed two routing protocols with 
the purpose of improving network efficiency and reducing 
power consumption. The protocols are Velocity Energy-
efficient and Link-aware Cluster-Tree (VELCT) [34] and 
Cluster Independent Data Collection tree (CIDT) [35].  
Enhanced Cluster-Based Routing Protocol (ECBR-MWSN) 
was proposed by Anitha and Kamalakkannan based on the 
influence of both CBR-Mobile and LEACH-Mobile [36]. The 
proposed protocol uses five stages including re-clustering and 
rerouting phases. The selection of cluster heads is based on three 
factors, which are residual energy, mobility, distance from the 
base station [18].  
Proactive Highly Ambulatory Sensor Routing (PHASeR) was 
proposed by Hayes and Ali for MWSNs. The PHASeR protocol 
uses global Time-division multiple access in the Medium access 
control (TDMA-MAC) layer to assign time slots for each node 
[37].  
Ring Routing Protocol was proposed by Tunca et al. with 
consideration for the energy consumption and network lifetime. 
The ring protocol consists of forming a virtual ring with an 
anchor node that is close to the mobile sink to collect the data. 
The virtual rings change while the mobile sink moves to cover 
all nodes in the network [38]. 
Anycast Tree-Based Routing Protocol is another protocol that 
was designed to reduce energy consumption and minimize 
traffic. The protocol is part of reactive routing protocols with 
maintaining the routing information. It is based on unicast 
messaging and the expansion of ring search in mobile multiple 
sink nodes [39].  
Fuzzy logic, swarm logic, genetic algorithms, and solving 
nondeterministic Polynomial optimization problems was used 
to find the optimal solution for the relation of the energy 
consumption, number of nodes, and lifetime of the network. 
Genetic Algorithm Based Routing Protocol (GAROUTE) was 
one of these optimization efforts [40]. Another algorithm is 
Clustering Algorithm Based on Glowworm Swarm 
Optimization (CAGM) which was developed by Wang et al. 
which divides the network to clusters based on the glowworm 
swarm optimization algorithm [41]. 
Many other enhanced routing protocols were proposed for 
optimizing the energy consumption, network reliability, and 
prolonging the lifetime of the network. All the aforementioned 
routing protocols did not consider any security measures to 
protect the routed data or to protect routing functionality from 
attackers. 
IV. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN MWSN 
MWSN shares many characteristics with the typical 
computer networks but also has unique security requirements 
with regards to the nature of the network. The main MWSN 
security requirements are [13]: 
 
• Confidentiality: in the MWSN, the data should be 
protected from unauthorized access. The key distribution 
methods should be secured and certain public 
information including node identity and public keys 
should be kept safe from being exposed to unauthorized 
access [42]. 
• Integrity: Because MWSNs could be deployed in hostile 
or outdoor environments, the data collected, processed, 
or transferred should be protected from manipulations.  
The integrity of the data is a core requirement of sensor 
networks. In MWSN, most sensor nodes operate on 
limited power sources where the recharging may not be 
an option. Because integrity requires security operations 
that could heavily affect the limited resources of the 
sensor nodes, lightweight algorithms are required [43] 
[44].   
• Availability: The availability and reliability of the 
network are critical to the operation of MWSNs. System 
failures can lead to serious consequences such as 
economic losses, environmental damages, or even put 
humans at risk. The main sources of impact on system 
availability are security attacks, software and hardware 
failures, and the lack of structured approaches. The 
MWSN functionalities should be available even during 
attacks or faults by implementing redundancy, attack 
prevention and mitigation, and failure control [45].  
• Authentication: Authentication is the process of 
identifying the source node in MWSN communications 
and verifying its assumed identity. Because of the 
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broadcasting nature of the MWSN, verifying the source 
entities is always a challenge. The authentication can be 
accomplished by using Message Authentication Code 
MAC for the communications between nodes. Because 
sensor nodes in most cases are limited in resources and 
because authentication operations require high resource 
consumption, authenticating all income traffic in a 
network with broadcasting nature is not possible and, in 
some cases, intentionally ignored to preserve nodes 
energy. Malicious nodes can create a massive number of 
packets, disturb the routing functionality, direct the 
traffic toward itself, and create a denial of service attacks 
(DoS). Some lightweight authentication algorithms were 
proposed by researchers such as the Biphase 
authentication scheme, which offers small-scale 
authentication and provides resistance against DoS 
attacks [46].     
• Data freshness: The data freshness in MWSN should be 
ensured by making sure that data is recent, and no old 
data is being replaced by malicious nodes. Adversaries 
can carry replay attacks when shared keys are being used 
in the MWSN. There are two main methods to achieve 
the data freshness requirement which are: (a) Data 
Dynamicity where the sequence of data is used by frames 
but only disclosed to the intended destination. And (b) 
Delay Tolerance and independent Processing where each 
packet is verified individually [47].  
• Secure localization: The location of the sensed event is 
crucial information in the setting of sensor networks. The 
location of events could determine the action required 
such as in sensing fire hazards. The location information 
can support functionalities such as geographical routing. 
The adversary can provide incorrect location information 
using false localization properties such as signal strength 
or by replaying packets. Attacks such as Replay, Sybil, 
and Wormhole attacks could target the localization in 
MWSN. There are many proposed schemes to protect 
against localization attacks. A proposed secure 
localization scheme is proposed by Lazos & Poovendran 
[48] which is called SeRLoc. SeRLoc is a range-
independent and decentralized localization scheme 
designed for resource-constrained untrusted 
environments such as MWSN [49].  
• Nodes self-organization: With the demand for flexibility 
and less human intervention and maintenance, required 
self-organization and self-healing is an essential feature 
of MWSN. Nodes are deployed without the prior 
knowledge of each other, but they are required to 
communicate and exchange data between themselves. 
Deploying nodes with pre-configured shared keys is not 
possible in many MWSN applications due to the 
dynamic nature of the network. Symmetric key pre-
distribution schemes were proposed by researchers such 
as [50] where the researchers used random key 
distribution based on random graph giant component 
theories. Moreover, the use of public keys in an efficient 
manner is essential. Nodes' self-organization should 
include trust relation, key management, and routing 
information [51].  
• Time synchronization: Time synchronization is a critical 
requirement in MWSN applications, as well as for 
security operations. Malicious attacks could break time 
synchronization by manipulating messages. To ensure 
network reliability, manipulation attacks should be 
detected and prevented.  In [52] the researchers proposed 
the “Maximum Consensus-Based Approach” to detect 
and invalidate malicious manipulation messages. A 
study by [53] proposed a toolbox of protocols to protect 
both the nodes within the power range and the nodes, 
which are multiple hops away. 
• Survivability and Self-stabilization: Nodes should have 
the ability to recover from security incidents 
independently and without the need for intervention. The 
node should also survive through the incident and 
complete the intended tasks even in case of other failures 
affect the network [54].  
• Isolation: Nodes should have the ability to isolate 
themselves from other malicious nodes in the network 
and they should have the ability to detect abnormal 
behaviour of other nodes. Lightweight cryptographic 
schemes and trust management should help in isolating 
malicious nodes as discussed in [54]. 
In their survey, Riaz et al. classified the security aspects of 
the WSN networks into primary and secondary goals. The 
primary goal includes confidentiality, integrity, authorization, 
availability, and access control. Their classification of the 
secondary goals includes data freshness, route freshness, Self-
Organization, Secure Localization, Time Synchronization, and 
Power Management [55].  Route freshness is the ability to be 
flexible with the changes of network topology and to ensure the 
freshness of the routing table data. Attackers may deploy 
malicious nodes impersonating legitimate nodes and manipulate 
routing tables.  Power management indicates the ability to 
manage the limited power source of the nodes which can be 
affected by the attackers. An attack can drain the power source 
and result in a denial of the service. Such an attack can be carried 
by forcing critical nodes to participate in unnecessary operations 
such as routing updates or unnecessary processing. 
V. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN MWSN 
MWSNs are required to be reliable, dependable, available, 
and the data should be accessed only with proper authorization. 
Many factors play a major role in increasing the vulnerability of 
the network and its components. The mobility of the nodes 
contributes to introducing challenges to the security of MWSN. 
Mobile nodes have influence over the topology of the network 
as well as introducing new challenges related to the ability of 
nodes to change location or position. Mobility also adds more 
challenges related to the Medium Access Control (MAC) 
protocols compared to the stationary nodes in WSN. MAC 
protocols are essential for managing throughput, mobility, 
security, energy, and protection against collisions [56] [57]. 
Another factor is the nature of the deployment environment. In 
most applications on MWSN, nodes are being deployed in 
unattended environments, hostile environments, or 
environments with bad conditions where reliability, self-
healing, and self-configuration of nodes are challenged. The 
relationship between nodes such as nodes heterogeneity can also 
affect network vulnerability [58]. In their Survey on WSN 
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security attacks and challenges, Riaz et al. listed the WSN 
challenges that increase the vulnerability of the network as [55]: 
 
• Wireless Medium: MWSNs use wireless communication 
and wireless broadcasting which increase the 
accessibility of the attackers and passive eavesdropper.   
• Ad-Hoc deployment: Self-healing and self-organizing 
nodes is an essential feature of a reliable network.  This 
adds to the overhead of the system when the adversary 
deploys malicious nodes that replace legitimate failed 
nodes. 
• Environment hostility: Attackers may gain physical 
access to the nodes deployed in hostile or unattended 
environments. Physical access to nodes may allow 
access to information and security keys. 
• Resource constraints: In most of the applications of the 
MWSN, the nodes are limited in terms of resources. 
Security operations demand a high consumption of 
energy, memory, bandwidth, and processor. Security 
operations are required to be efficient to preserve nodes 
and network resources.   
• Network Scalability: MWSN can include a huge number 
of nodes. Securing huge networks requires proper 
design, proper implementation, and efficient security 
operations with as little effect as possible on the network 
resources 
VI. MWSN SECURITY THREATS AND ATTACKS 
According to Jawandhiya et al. [59] security attacks can be 
classified based on the attacker location as external or internal. 
In the external attack, the attacker's objective is to disturb the 
services of the MWSN by targeting availability. On the other 
hand, the internal attacker's objective is to gain access and target 
confidentiality and integrity. The internal attacker may use 
compromised nodes to lunch malicious attacks. 
Security attacks can be classified based on the attacker's 
goals into passive and active attacks. In the passive attacks, the 
attacker passively monitors the traffic and try to gain access to 
privileged information. During the passive attack, the attacker 
avoids detection and does not disturb the network services. 
Passive attacks may include eavesdropping, traffic analysis, 
capturing communications, and decryption of encrypted 
information. On the other hand, active attacks' goal is to take 
actions against the targeted network by upsetting the services, 
modifying data, lunching malicious attacks, or gaining control 
of resources. Most of the active attacks start passive to study the 
network vulnerabilities and to design the active attack plan [59] 
[55] [58].    
In addition, Yang et al. classified the attacks based on the 
intention of the attacker as node compromise attacks, 
repudiation attacks, packet-oriented attacks, protocol-oriented 
attacks, and denial of service (DoS) attacks which is the hardest 
to detect, complicated, and destructive [54] [60].  
Security attacks in WSN target different layers in the Open 
Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. For example, the 
physical layer can be affected by jamming and tampering 
attacks. The link-layer can be compromised by Collision, 
Exhaustion, and Unfairness attacks. Attacks on network and 
routing layer are Neglect and greed, Homing, Misdirection, and 
Blackholes. The transport layer can be targeted by Flooding and 
Desynchronization attacks [61].  
Sen [13] defined three main categories for the attacks on 
MWSN based on its target: Attacks on the availability of the 
network, attacks on privacy and authentication, and the attacks 
on the integrity of the system. First, attacks on the availability 
aim to disrupt or parallelize the network and are referred to as 
DoS attacks. DoS attacks can introduce real-world danger on 
critical applications such as attacks on health sensors attached 
to the human body. Second, attacks on privacy and authorization 
include modification, message replay, spoofing, and 
eavesdropping. The attacks aim to access privileged information 
without proper authorization. Using cryptographic methods can 
protect against these attacks. Finally, the attacks on the integrity 
aim to falsify data by injecting false data into network nodes. 
A. Passive attacks 
Passive attacks are designed to be stealthy to achieve the 
goals of reconnaissance or obtaining confidential information. 
These attacks usually carried in the form of eavesdropping or 
traffic monitoring and analysis [59] [62] [58] [55].  
 
• Eavesdropping: the attacker intercepts the wireless 
connection by conducting overhearing attempts to the 
MWSN and tries to gain sensitive information such as 
passwords, cryptographic keys, or unprotected clear text 
communications. The eavesdropper tries to detect the 
content of the communication.  The eavesdropping 
activity is usually the initial behaviour of active attacks 
such as Blackhole and wormhole. 
• Traffic monitoring and analysis: The attacker monitors 
and captures the transmitted packets in the wireless 
network. Analysis of the captured packets may leak the 
source and destination addresses and may also give the 
attacker insight into the structure of the network.  
• The homing attack is one of the attacks related to traffic 
monitoring and analysis. In the Homing Attack, the 
attacker monitors the traffic and analyses it to determine 
the critical nodes in the network such as sink or cluster 
head nodes. The homing attack is used in advance of 
launching active attacks on critical nodes. Because the 
attacker studies the traffic and finds the critical node, 
implementing a prevention method by sending “dummy 
packets”, which will help in ruining the attacker's 
findings [54].     
B. Active attacks 
In the active attacks, the attacker attempts to inflect changes 
to the data, operations, or availability of the network. The 
attacker may use the network resources to accomplish the goal 
of the attack such as replaying old messages, broadcasting false 
information, or attracting routed packets to malicious nodes. 
The active attacker may use different types of attacks to disable 
the operation of the network such as in the denial of service 
attacks.  
DoS attacks family contains various types of attacks with the 
main purpose of disturbing the entire network or at least a 
critical part of it. In mobile networks, more types of DoS attacks 
are available because of the nature of the mobility of network 
components and the wireless transmission medium. Various 
types of DoS attacks are discussed in this section.   
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Kahina Chelli [58] classified active security attacks in WSN 
as Blackhole, Replay, Sinkhole, spoofing, flooding, jamming, 
Sybil, overwhelming, wormhole, DoS, fabrication, hello flood, 
node subversion, man in the middle, selective forwarding, and 
false node attacks. 
Mobile wireless sensor networks and mobile ad-hoc 
networks MANETs have different properties such as the focus 
of interaction of the network where MWSN focuses on 
gathering information from the environment whereas MANET 
focuses on computational distribution. But MWSNs are much 
larger, nodes are less equipped, and communication is mostly 
broadcasted. Despite their differences, they share the security 
weaknesses and most of the types of attacks because of some 
unique similarities between both networks [63]. In their survey 
of MANET attacks, Jawandhiya et al. listed the most known 
active attacks on MANET as: Jamming attack, Wormhole 
attack, Blackhole attack, Byzantine attack, Routing Attacks 
(Routing Table Overflow, Routing Table Poisoning, Packet 
Replication, Route Cache Poisoning, Rushing Attack), 
Resource consumption attack, IP Spoofing attack, State 
Pollution attack, Sybil attack, Fabrication, Modification, 
Session Hijacking attack, SYN Flooding attack, Repudiation 
attack, Denial of Service attack, Location disclosure attack, 
Flooding attack, Impersonation or Spoofing attack, Colluding 
misrelay attack, Device tampering attack, Grayhole attack, Link 
spoofing attack, Neighbour attack, Jellyfish attack, Packet 
dropping attacks, and Sleep deprivation torture. 
Yang et al. studied underwater mobile wireless sensors 
networks (UWSN) security challenges and attacks. UWSNs 
shares the same attack types with their parent network WSN. In 
their research, the attacks listed were: Jamming, Collision, 
Exhaustion, Denial-of-Sleep, Unfairness, Replay, Selective 
Forwarding, Neglect and Greed, Misdirection, 
Blackhole/Grayhole, Sinkhole, Wormhole, Sybil, Hello 
Flooding, Homing, Desynchronization, and Synchronization 
Flooding Attacks. The following sections discuss, the most 
known active attacks presented in  [59] [13] [64] [58] [55] [54]:    
1) Jamming attacks 
The jamming attack is considered a physical layer attack. It 
generates radio interference with other nodes’ signal in the 
MWSNs. Jamming can be done by overwhelming the radio 
frequency with useless communication which prevents the 
nodes in MWSN from communicating. Jamming devices can be 
distributed throughout the network to cripple the whole network 
communications. Jamming is considered also a DoS attack and 
can be temporary, intermittent, or continuous. Intermittent 
jamming attacks can cripple the network similar to the 
continuous attacks if the network is using time-critical 
synchronization. Also, targeting critical nodes such as cluster 
heads, root nodes, or sink node can cripple the entire network. 
Because of the hostile and unattended nature of MWSN, the 
jamming attacks are very hard to prevent [65] [13] [54].  
Preventing jamming attacks maybe impossible giving that 
the signal at the physical layer is affected. Del-Valle-Soto et al. 
proposed two jamming attacks detection methods. The first 
method depends on sharing performance metrics between 
neighbour nodes. The second method proposed dividing the 
network into zones with an information collector node for each 
zone to compare the collected information with the performance 
metrics. When a zone is detected, the zone is marked and 
isolated [66]. The second method requires dedicated nodes to be 
used as a collector with higher specification and power source 
than the rest of the nodes to be able to cope with the assigned 
tasks. This approach introduces more burdens on the MWSNs 
deployment.     
2) Tampering attack  
Tampering attack is another example of a physical layer 
attack. The nature of MWSNs environment is usually hostile, 
unattended, and distributed. Also, the sensor devices are small 
in size and are most of the time portable and located outdoor. 
These features allow attackers to physically access, damage, 
modify or steal the sensor devices. By physically accessing the 
sensor devices, the attacker can inject malicious codes or 
programs, capture the cryptographic keys, and replace sensors. 
Protection methods typically include physically securing the 
devices and enhancing cryptographic features of the node to 
prevent data and keys capture [65] [13] [54].  
Protecting against tampering attacks is not trivial and 
involves many layer protection techniques starting with 
securing the device from being damaged or stolen to the 
protection of the devices' information from being revealed. The 
mobility of the sensor nodes in MWSN adds other challenges 
comparing to the stationary networks. In their study, Tallez et 
al. investigated the bootstrap loader brute force attacks on the 
MSP430 microcontroller units. They found that the attacker 
could gain passwords in a matter of days and later gain sensitive 
information about WSN cryptographic keys. They proposed a 
randomizing method to secure the bootstrap password to protect 
against reverse engineering the units. In their proposal, they 
found this method succeeded to increase the difficulty of brute 
force attacks by increasing the time needed to complete the brute 
force attack from few days to a matter of decades [67]. 
3)  Wormhole attack 
Wormhole attack is considered a network layer attack. The 
attacker establishes a connection between two portions of the 
network mostly between two different malicious nodes to 
connect two parts of the network by creating a wormhole tunnel. 
The packets captured in one end of the tunnel will be 
broadcasted to the other end. Wormhole attack can be 
devastating, hard to detect and not easy to prevent because the 
attacker can begin the attack without the need to compromise 
nodes or breakthrough cryptographic defenses. The success rate 
of the attack is increased if the nodes are a long distance from 
each other and the tunnel connection is faster and at lower 
latency than the normal route, which attracts the nodes to use 
the malicious fast route. The tunnel may use a fast wired or 
radio-frequency connection between the malicious nodes. The 
tunnel attracts the packet forwarding and disrupts the normal 
routing functionalities of the network. Because of the wireless 
nature of the network and the mobility of the nodes, the attacker 
is able to capture the packets from one end and send it to another 
end even if the packets are not routed through the malicious 
tunnel [65] [13] [54]. 
Wormhole detection and prevention research has attracted 
many researchers because of the challenges and the severe effect 
on the network. Adarkar et al. proposed a detection and 
prevention method for the wormhole attack using the “packet 
leach” mechanism. The leaches are information that attaches to 
the packets containing information about the allowed 
transmission distance. The proposed method consists of two 
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types of leaches, geographical and temporal. Geographical 
leaches depend on the location of the nodes and can use a 
loosely synchronized clock between the nodes. On the other 
hand, the temporal leaches depend on the exact time and require 
the nodes to be tightly synchronized. The proposed solution 
introduced a protocol “TIK” to achieve instant authentication to 
prevent wormhole attacks [68].   
In addition, Harsányi et al. proposed a new wormhole 
detection method using spanning trees. Their method depends 
only on network connectivity information and does not require 
additional measurements. Their proposed solution depends on 
the feature of the Wormhole of providing faster and shorter 
routes. Based on this assumption, the removal of a wormhole 
will severely affect the shortest path used by nodes close to the 
wormhole in the network while other nodes' shortest route will 
remain. Running iterative searches for the changed routes from 
different nodes will provide information about the affected 
nodes and Wormhole details [69].  
4) Blackhole and Grayhole attacks 
The Blackhole attack is classified as a network layer attack. 
In the Blackhole attack, the attacker will compromise a node or 
deploy a malicious node to the network. The malicious node will 
forge and send routing information during the route update or 
route pathfinding to all nodes falsely pretending to be the 
shortest and less cost path to destinations. The malicious node 
then may drop all packets or can selectively forward part of the 
packets. The Blackhole can be used as a DoS attack when the 
attacker drops all packets. If the attacker deliberately doped the 
packets in an intermittent way, the attack will be much harder to 
detect. This type of Blackhole attack is called a Grayhole attack 
and is more sophisticated. While the Blackhole attack is part of 
the DoS attacks, a Grayhole attack is considered part of selective 
forwarding attacks [65] [13] [54].  
Deepak et al. proposed a detection and prevention method 
for Blackhole and Grayhole attacks using trust-based routing. 
The proposed solution is based on minimizing the probability of 
nodes to select the malicious nodes as the best route forwarding 
option by using trusted route-finding algorithms and elliptic 
curve cryptography (ECC) for securing data. The encrypted data 
is verified by the two-stage security mechanism in each node. 
The routing path is secured by trust route-finding and by sending 
detection packets through routing paths [70]. While the 
proposed solution shows promising protection levels, the 
resource consumption by the encryption, verification, and used 
searching methods tend to drain the limited resources.   
Aslam Khan et al. proposed a solution based on two stages 
for detecting and prevention for Blackhole attacks. They applied 
the proposed solution to the Low-energy adaptive clustering 
hierarchy LEACH protocol. The detection is carried offline 
during the cluster head setup time. The detection phase depends 
on the pre-installed agent on the sensor nodes. The agent will 
listen to the advertising cluster head messages, classified them, 
and update the cluster head lists. The other stage is the 
prevention, which is carried during the LEACH protocol setup. 
The nodes will query the malicious lists created during the 
detection phase and drop the advertised cluster head request if 
the node is suspected to be malicious. During the simulation of 
Blackhole attacks, they found the accuracy of detection is very 
high with few false positives comparing to the anomaly 
detection techniques [71]. While the detection accuracy is high, 
the system has significant requirements to work such as the need 
for a pre-installed agent, malicious and audit list, and units to 
perform different tasks. The requirements of the system can 
significantly affect the performance and resources of the system.  
5) Sinkhole Attack 
Sinkhole attack is part of network layer attacks. The 
Sinkhole attacks can be considered a special type of Blackhole 
attack, which is designed to target the sink node. In the Sinkhole 
attack, the attacker inserts a malicious node or compromises one 
of the existing nodes of the network. The compromised node 
will advertise a fast route to the base station to all neighbour 
nodes by using forged routing information. Neighbour nodes 
will choose the compromised node as the preferred routing path 
to the base station. The scale of the attack depends on the 
proximity of the compromised node to the sink node. If the 
compromised node is very close to the sink node, the attacker 
could attract all the traffic or a large portion of the network 
traffic, which will be forwarded through the compromised node. 
The attack will result in granting the attacker control over the 
captured traffic [13] [55] [54].  
A detection method based on hop counts was proposed by 
Abdulla et al. [72]. The proposed solution applies to stationary 
nodes with a fixed distance from the base station. The proposed 
method requires the base station to send a HELLO message 
containing hop count information. The message will travel from 
the base toward the more distant node in the network and adding 
hop counts. Each node then will have a short and long path to 
the base station. Any advertised route that does not fall into the 
normal threshold of the route hop count will be considered 
suspicious. While this proposed solution seems promising in 
detecting and preventing Sinkhole attacks, the solution can be 
applied only on stationary node structure with a fixed distance 
to the base station. With the mobility requirement of MWSN, 
this solution cannot work without proper enhancement.     
6) Byzantine attack 
The byzantine attack is related to the network layer. The 
attack is taking the name from the “Byzantine Generals 
Problem” where Byzantine generals need to communicate and 
reach an agreement about a battle plan, but one or more generals 
are traitors. The problem is used to study the reliability of the 
computer system in the presence of malfunctioning components 
[73].   
The Byzantine attack involves one or more compromised 
nodes working in a complicit way to carry-on different type of 
attacks such as forwarding packets through non-optimal routes, 
creating routing loops, or selectively drops packets thus 
degrading the performance of the network, disruption the 
network routing services, and draining the resources of the 
network component. The Byzantine attack is not easy to detect 
because the network does not demonstrate detectable abnormal 
activities [74] [59] [13] [55]. 
Anusuya et al. proposed a detection method called 
“Enhancement cooperative bait detection scheme” for byzantine 
attack based on sending bait message with a destination address 
of the neighbour node to lure the malicious node to send RREP 
messages. The malicious nodes are detected using reverse 
tracing and then added to the malicious nodes list, which is sent 
to the nodes participating in the routing of the bait message [75]. 
7) Routing Attacks 
Routing attacks carried through the network layer and 
targets the routing functionality of the network. There are 
several types of routing attacks such as Routing Table 
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Poisoning, Route Cache Poisoning, Routing Table Overflow, 
Packet replication, and Rushing attacks [59] [13] [55] [54].  
 
Routing Table Poisoning: Malicious nodes in the network 
attempt to send fake routing updates or change the legitimate 
routing information in the packets. The attack aims to create 
network congestion, performance degradation, or major 
disruption of routing services.    
 
Route Cache Poisoning: While proactive routing protocols rely 
on the routing tables, reactive routing protocols utilize caches to 
store recently discovered routes for better performance. The 
attacker will attempt to overwhelm the cache with fake routes to 
prevent the creation of new legitimate records. 
 
Routing Table Overflow:  Proactive routing protocols tend to 
create routing entries in advance instead of on-demand route 
path discovery conducted by reactive routing protocols. This 
advance creation allows malicious nodes to send excessive fake 
routing advertisements for non-existence nodes. The malicious 
node attempts to overwhelm the routing tables to prevent the 
creation of new legitimate routing entries. Because reactive 
routing protocols are collecting routing information on-demand 
bases, they are less affected by this type of attack. 
 
Packet Replication: Malicious nodes will attempt to replicate 
old messages to confuse the routing functionality to consume 
bandwidth and power resources.    
 
Rushing Attack: The attack is applicable to the routing 
protocols that use duplicate packets discard mechanism 
“duplicate suppression”. In the attack, the malicious node, 
which is located in the routing path of a source node will receive 
a route request RREQ packets. The malicious node will send the 
packet quickly “Rush” to the destination node. The destination 
node will discard the duplicated RREQ from the source node 
assuming it is a duplicated packet. The source node will 
continue to use the same routing path including the malicious 
node because it is unable to discover new routes. The Rushing 
attack is very difficult to detect in the MWSN networks.    
To protect against routing attacks, many researchers 
proposed enhancement to the existing on-demand routing 
protocols such as Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) and Ad hoc 
On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV). Secure routing 
protocols based on DSR and AODV such as Ariadne, 
Authenticated Routing for Ad Hoc Networks (ARAN), and 
Secured SAODV were proposed to fulfill the security 
requirements of message routing. Although when these secured 
routing protocols are subjected to Rushing attack, they are 
unable to discover routes that are more than two hops away [76].   
Hu et al. [76] analysed the routing protocols under the 
rushing attack and proposed the Rushing Attack Prevention 
RAP protocol. Their proposed solution can be integrated into 
the secure routing protocols such as Ariadne, ARAN, SADOV. 
When integrated with the secure routing protocols, RAP will not 
consume resources unless the node is unable to find a usable 
route when the network is under a rushing attack. Even though 
they found RAP is highly effective, they also found that RAP 
overhead is higher than the standard route discovery protocols 
[76]. 
8) Resource consumption attack 
Resource consumption attack, sleep deprivation attack [59] 
[55], resource depletion attack [13], [55], Denial-of-Sleep [54], 
or resource exhaustion attack [58] [64] all refer to same attack 
methodology. The attacker attempts to drain and consume the 
limited resources of sensor nodes. In the resource-constrained 
environment such as MWSN, battery life is preserved by putting 
the nodes in sleep or power-saving mode to preserve the battery 
power. The resource consumption attack will usually consume 
the battery life, thus taking the node out of service. The attack 
can be carried using unnecessary forwarded packets, route 
requests, beacon packets, or false requests. The attack is usually 
carried through the network layer in the form of route or packet 
requests but can be carried through the transport layer using 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) unnecessary frequent 
handshake. This attack could be devastating in WSN by 
presenting nodes to enter power-saving mode, especially in the 
networks that are designed and configured for infrequent 
communication to prolong the battery life [58] [59] [55] [13] 
[54]. 
Bhattasali et al. proposed an anomaly detection approach to 
detect sleep deprivation attacks. The proposed solution is based 
on normal predefined parameter values comparisons. The model 
they designed exclude malicious code and reject its 
communication [77].  
9)  Sybil attack 
Sybil attack is a network layer attack. In the Sybil attack, a 
malicious node will assume multiple identities to conduct the 
intended malicious behaviour. The Sybil attack targets unfair 
voting, attacking routing algorithms, misleading fair resource 
allocation, and defeat misbehaviour detection. The attack 
behaves the same way regardless of attack objectives. In the 
attack against voting mechanism, the multiple identities 
assumed by one node will create multiple votes, which affect 
the credibility and fairness of the system. In the attack against 
the routing algorithms, the multiple identities of a node will 
create multiple routing paths through the same malicious node 
[13] [59] [64] [55]. 
Dhamodharan and Vayanaperumal [78] proposed a 
detection and prevention method based on a validation list. 
When new nodes join the network, the base station will send the 
HELLO message and the new node will be registered. For any 
new node in the network, a HELLO message and timestamp will 
be created representing a birth certificate for the node. The 
system will compare the newly registered node with the base 
station validation list to detect the malicious nodes. A message 
authentication process will be used to prevent malicious nodes 
from sending unicast and multicast messages.  
10) Flooding attack 
Flooding attacks aim to overwhelm network and nodes 
resources by sending a massive number of requests to create 
degradation or denial of the service. Flooding attacks can be 
carried using different types of methodologies. HELLO-flood 
attack is one of the network layer flood attacks. In the HELLO 
attack, the attacker sends a massive number of HELLO packets. 
The HELLO packets are used by the routing protocol to 
establish the network topology by discovering neighbour nodes. 
The attacker may use a strong signal transmitter to falsely 
present as shortest path route. Nodes that receive HELLO 
packets will attempt to reply to the sender even if the node is out 
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of their transmitter range. Route request (RREQ) flooding attack 
is also a network layer flooding attack. The attacker floods the 
network with a large amount of RREQ to non-existence 
destination. Nodes will not reply and will keep forwarding the 
request which will overwhelm the network and could lead to 
denial of service. SYN flood attack is another type of flood 
attack that is related to transport layer attacks. In Transmission 
Control Protocol TCP, the three-way handshake consists of 
sending SYN request, receiving SYN/ACK, and returning ACK 
reply. In the SYN flood attack, the attacker will send SYN 
requests without replying, which forces the targeted node to 
wait for the completed handshake communication. Sending a 
massive amount of SYN request will overwhelm the nodes [59] 
[64] [13] [64] [55].  
Chen et al. proposed a detection and prevention methods for 
low-rate DoS attacks. They combined the measurement of 
correlation coefficient and Kolmogorov–Smirnov test to create 
a trust value for each component. The value is based on the 
signal produced by the low-rate DoS attack. In order to gain the 
trust of the system, nodes should satisfy certain evaluation 
conditions and predefined tolerance values. Otherwise, nodes 
identified as low trust [79]. 
11) De-synchronization Attack 
De-synchronization is the interruption of an active 
connection between network nodes. An adversary will send 
forge communication with fake sequence numbers and control 
flags to disrupt normal communication between nodes, forcing 
the nodes to request retransmission of the missed packets. When 
the attack is timed correctly, it could prevent the nodes from 
communicating data and instead wasting more energy in trying 
to recover errors and resynchronized the transmission. De-
synchronization attacks can make more damage when combined 
with other attacks such as wormhole, Sybil, or Replay attacks 
where these attacks affect the round-trip time between nodes 
and thus affect the time alignment  
Preventing De-synchronization attacks require header or full 
packet authentication. There are security schemes related to 
authentication in MWSN such as Sensor Protocol for 
Information via Negotiation (SPIN), Broadcast Session Key 
Protocol (BROSK), and Localized Encryption and 
Authentication Protocol (LEAP). Riaz et al. proposed a solution 
for authentication based on two phases of authentication called 
the Biphase Authentication Scheme (BAS). The initial phase 
requires the new node to register to authentication nodes 
distributed across the network. If the node is authenticated 
through the authenticated node, the second phase will require 
the node to authenticate through the base station [46] [60] [13] 
[54].   
12) Packet Replay Attack 
The Packet Replay attack is a network layer attack where the 
attacker intercepts the transmitted packets from the source node, 
delay the packets, and send them again to the receiver node. The 
delay will result in receiving false location as a result of the false 
time and different signal strength. The attack is more serious for 
mobile nodes with critical location requirement. Authentication 
in this case, helps to protect from packet replay attacks [55] [54].  
Marigowda et al. proposed a solution for the Replay attacks 
based on a synchronized incremental counter that is attached to 
the packets with each transmission. The counter increment with 
each delay or each hop and will be verified at the receiver side 
to check if the packet was exposed to the Replay attack. The 
synchronization solution is built within each node [80].   
13) Selective Forwarding Attack 
This attack is related to the network layer. During the attack, 
malicious or compromised node attackers will perform normal 
tasks and will forward packets normally for most of network but 
will selectively drop some packets. The main goal of the attack 
is to suppress or modify intended packets for specific nodes. 
This intended targeting makes the attack difficult to detect.  
Neglect and Greed attacks are special cases of selective 
forwarding. In the Neglect attack, the attacker will selectively 
drop the packets but will still acknowledge the source node. In 
Greed attacks, the attacker will give priority to specific packets 
or its own [64] [54].  
To protect from selective forwarding attack, redundancy of 
messages and alternative routes methods should be used. Chung 
and Cho proposed a multi-path routing determination algorithm 
based on fuzzy logic to detect selective forwarding attacks in 
MWSNs. They compared their solution with the multi-hop 
extension of Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) 
called AOMDV and found that using the fuzzy logic saved 
around 10% of the energy [81].  
14)  Data Modification Attacks 
Modification of the data or injecting false information are 
attacks aiming to compromise the integrity of the system. These 
attacks can be carried at different layers of the network and 
using different methods. The attacker may have physical access 
to the node or to the sensing area of the node. Data integrity can 
be compromised if the attacker injected false data into the sensor 
readings such as exposing a thermal sensor to false 
temperatures. Other types of data modification could be carried 
by much-sophisticated attacks targeting the data aggregation 
operation across the entire sensor network such as packet 
misrouting and impersonation attacks [59] [58] [55].   
Cui et al. proposed a solution for the confidentiality and 
integrity of data aggregation in WSNs. Their solution uses end-
to-end lightweight encryption based on Okamoto-Uchiyama 
homomorphic encryption algorithm and using a lightweight 
homomorphic message authentication code (MAC) algorithm 
for data integrity [82].  
Figure 2 shows the different types of the security attacks in 
MWSN. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 With the rapid development in IoT and information 
technology, new challenges have arisen with regards to routing 
and security in MWSNs, therefore, this article presented in 
detail the researches carried on MWSN. It analysed the major 
technical challenges related to routing and security, as well as, 
discussed most of the existing literature works in MWSNs that 
aim at providing efficient routing and secure communication in 
MWSNs. The article reviewed well-known state-of-art routing 
protocols that are suitable for MWSNs and discussed their 
functioning and security mechanism. In addition, we reviewed 
most security threats that targets WSNs, and the proposed 
solutions for these threats in the literature.  




Fig. 2. Classifications of security attacks. 
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